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STANDING, POLITICS, AND EXHAUSTION: A RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE EXHAUSTION

HEATHER ELLIOTT*
ABSTRACT
Professor Michael Sant’Ambrogio’s article, Legislative Exhaustion, usefully approaches the problem of “legislative standing” by
abandoning the typical Article III standing analysis and making
instead a separation-of-powers argument. His theory—that Congress
may sue the President only when it has no legislative avenue for
addressing its problems—provides both a workable account of and
a limiting principle for suits by the legislative branch against the
executive. His analysis, however, raises questions regarding the effect
of legislative lawsuits on the constitutional balance of powers. This
Essay suggests that these questions should be more fully explored
before Professor Sant’Ambrogio’s approach can be adopted. It concludes by noting that the exhaustion principle, while helpful in the
fraught context of legislative standing, should not be expanded to
standing more generally (as a few courts appear to have suggested).

* Professor of Law, the University of Alabama School of Law. I should disclose, because
I discuss the nomination of Chief Judge Merrick Garland of the D.C. Circuit to the U.S.
Supreme Court, that I served as a law clerk to Chief Judge Garland in 2000-2001. Thanks to
Michael Sant’Ambrogio for his helpful comments on this Essay.

65

Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018

1

William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 58 [2018], Art. 3

66

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:65

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. LEGISLATIVE STANDING V. LEGISLATIVE EXHAUSTION . . . . . . .
II. THE LARGER SEPARATION-OF-POWERS CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . .
A. A Reverse Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Consequences of the Reverse Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. EXHAUSTION SHOULD NOT BE A GENERAL
STANDING REQUIREMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Some Courts Suggest that Exhaustion Is a General
Standing Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Exhaustion in General Cannot Be an Article III
Requirement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol58/iss1/3

67
69
73
73
76
79
80
82
83

2

Elliott: Standing, Politics, and Exhaustion: A Response to Legislative Exh

2017]

STANDING, POLITICS, AND EXHAUSTION

67

INTRODUCTION
Standing doctrine fails to provide convincing answers to the separation-of-powers question of when (if ever) Congress1 may invoke
the jurisdiction of the federal courts to sue the executive branch.2 In
Legislative Exhaustion, Professor Michael Sant’Ambrogio argues
instead for a principle of legislative exhaustion to condition Congress’s access to the federal courts.3 If Congress has a legislative
avenue for solving its problems, it may not sue, but when no legislative avenue exists, it may.4 On this theory, Professor Sant’Ambrogio
concludes that jurisdiction is available primarily when Congress
brings constitutional challenges to presidential inaction based on
constitutional objections.5
Professor Sant’Ambrogio’s theory is a welcome addition to the
literature. Even though the Court has stated that standing “is built
on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers”6—standing
doctrine is actually not terribly good at answering separation-ofpowers questions.7 As I argue below, the literature on legislative
standing is more successful the further it gets from traditional
concepts of standing doctrine and the more it focuses on actual
separation-of-powers issues.8 And because the legislative exhaustion
theory takes this approach, it works.
The idea of legislative exhaustion also prompts further questions.
For example, would an exhaustion principle, or something like it,
work in reverse? One can imagine the executive branch suing
Congress or a house thereof for dereliction of duty—for example, the
1. For ease of reference, I will usually refer to Congress as the legislative entity that is
seeking standing. But, of course, legislative standing can involve the effort to sue of not only
Congress, but also the House, the Senate, a block of legislators, or individual legislators. See,
e.g., Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM . & MARY L. REV. 1255, 1264-72
(2017). When appropriate, I will refer to the more specific legislative entity.
2. See id. at 1258-59 nn.1-3 (collecting citations to the vast literature on legislative standing and its failings).
3. Id. at 1316-20.
4. Id. at 1318-19.
5. Id. at 1319.
6. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
7. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN . L. REV. 459, 463-64 (2008).
8. See infra Part I.
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Senate’s refusal to hold hearings on Chief Judge Merrick Garland’s
nomination to the Supreme Court.9 But, as I explain below, such a
suit is likely prohibited under current law. Professor Sant’Ambrogio’s theory would thus give asymmetric access: Congress, but
not the President, could sue a coequal branch. If, then, we think
Congress should have access to the federal courts, is there a principle that would give the President similar access? Add to this
consideration of the courts’ own power vis-à-vis Congress and the
President: How does it affect the federal courts to be pulled into
such interbranch disputes? These issues suggest that, although
legislative exhaustion is an excellent theory upon which to base
congressional power to sue the executive branch, invoking the theory requires caution.
A wholly separate line of questions arises from the concept of
exhaustion itself as a threshold constitutional requirement for jurisdiction. Professor Sant’Ambrogio provides excellent reasons to apply
such a concept in the fraught context of legislator litigation.10 But a
few lower courts have recently suggested that standing doctrine in
general requires plaintiffs to show that they have exhausted other
avenues of redress before they may turn to the courts.11 This use of
generalized exhaustion as a constitutional barrier to suit invades
Congress’s power to craft remedial schemes when it enacts statutes
and should be abandoned.
In Part I of what follows, I discuss what I think is particularly
helpful about Professor Sant’Ambrogio’s abandonment of standing
doctrine in answering the question of federal jurisdiction over
Congress-versus-President lawsuits. In Part II, I explore questions
raised by the legislative exhaustion approach for other separationof-powers contexts and suggest that, without compensating theories
to be used against Congress, our constitutional powers may end up
out of balance. I then demonstrate, in Part III, why a more general
idea of exhaustion should not be a constitutional threshold for
obtaining federal jurisdiction.

9. See infra Part II.
10. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 1261-62.
11. See infra Part III.
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I. LEGISLATIVE STANDING V. LEGISLATIVE EXHAUSTION
As Professor Sant’Ambrogio ably explains, standing doctrine has
not been able to solve the puzzle of when, if at all, Congress may
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts to challenge the
executive branch.12 This is because standing doctrine—injury-infact, causation, and redressability13—does not perform well in
answering this kind of question. Even though the Court has stated
that standing “is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation
of powers”14—standing doctrine is actually not terribly good at
answering separation-of-powers questions.15 As I have argued elsewhere, there is no single idea of separation of powers.16 Instead,
there are varied ideas about how the Constitution allocates, separates, and balances power among the three branches.
Whatever standing is built on, then, is not a “single basic idea.”17
And the single tool of standing doctrine turns out to be ill-suited for
the varied uses to which it has been put.18 Although standing
doctrine does a moderately good job at one separation-of-powers
function—ensuring that the plaintiff brings to the courts an Article
III case qua case with adverse parties19 and susceptible to judicial
resolution20—it fails utterly at other separation-of-powers functions,
such as keeping the courts out of disputes better resolved in the
political branches21 and limiting Congress’s overuse of citizen suits
to strong-arm the President.22
It is, accordingly, no surprise that standing doctrine has failed to
provide helpful answers to the question of when Congress itself can
12. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 1263-87.
13. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
14. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz.
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2695 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997).
15. See Elliott, supra note 7, at 463-64.
16. See id. at 461-63.
17. See id. at 460-61 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 752).
18. See id at 460-64.
19. But see United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013) (holding that the Article III “case” adversity is a prudential requirement rather than a constitutional one).
20. See Elliott, supra note 7, at 469-71.
21. See id. at 475-92.
22. See id. at 492-96.
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sue the President in federal court. As Professor Sant’Ambrogio
thoroughly demonstrates, the cases that directly address legislative
standing are sparse and provide no clear rules for determining
legislative access to the courts.23 And the cases that bear on
legislative standing indirectly, as well as the legislative standing
literature, provide no determinate principles for when Congress may
or may not bring suit against the executive branch.24 Standing
doctrine is simply not equipped to answer this kind of question.
Thus, the scholarship that has been most successful (in my view,
at least) in addressing legislative “standing” actually strays far from
the typical standing analysis of factual injury and instead focuses
on the Constitution. Professor Tara Grove, for example, focuses on
whether the Constitution empowers Congress to sue, analyzing
Article I and concluding that, because Article I does not seem to
empower Congress to sue, it probably cannot.25 Similarly, Professor
John Harrison argues that Article III questions are beside the point
and that the “fundamental conceptual and substantive features of
the Constitution’s allocation of the powers of government” show that
Congress may not bring suit against the executive branch for failure
to enforce the law.26 Professor Jonathan Nash investigates the
constitutional powers allocated to Congress and justifies legislative
standing when those powers have been compromised.27
23. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 1269-72.
24. See id. at 1272-80.
25. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 135355 (2014); see also Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent
Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 627 (2014).
26. See John Harrison, Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative Lawsuits, 31
J.L. & POL. 103, 104-05 (2015).
27. Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH . L.
REV. 339, 343 (2015). Admittedly, Professor Nash couches his argument in terms of injury-infact and standing, see id. at 343, 388, but his conceptualization of congressional injury in
terms of the Constitution takes him far from the typical factual inquiry involved in a standing
assessment, as exemplified by the Court’s tedious investigation into the travel situations of
the plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563-67 (1992).
I do not mean to suggest that these are the only three scholars who have addressed the
issue well. For other contributions to the legislative standing literature, see, for example,
Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve as Counterweight?, 54
U. PITT. L. REV. 63 (1992) (arguing for congressional lawsuits as a counterbalance to expanded
presidential power); David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN .
L. REV. 205 (2001); Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: The Consequences of
Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741 (1999).
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Professor Sant’Ambrogio’s theory, like the others just mentioned,
succeeds precisely because he recognizes that the separation-ofpowers question of when Congress can sue the President needs a
separation-of-powers answer. His answer is that Congress can
redress most of the problems it faces with the President through a
variety of legislative tools.28 Only when those tools fail—in other
words, only when there is legislative exhaustion—can Congress
invoke the jurisdiction of the courts against the President.29
The legislative exhaustion principle has three notable benefits, in
my view. The first, as I have already suggested, is that it replaces
the unhelpful question of whether Congress has standing to sue,
with the helpful and specific question of when separation-of-powers
principles justify a congressional suit. Such specificity (which is not
foreign to concerns of subject-matter jurisdiction30) is a welcome
alternative to the confusion embodied in, and increasing complications of, standing doctrine.31
The second benefit is that his theory provides for congressional
access to the courts in circumstances in which such access intuitively makes sense. The primary situation in which Professor Sant’Ambrogio concludes that Congress would be empowered to sue the
President is when “the Executive refuses to enforce a statutory
provision based on constitutional objections.”32 That is, if Congress
has enacted a statute to which the Executive raises constitutional
objections, the Executive should not have the last word. Instead, as
the Supreme Court has instructed us (for better or worse), it is the
28. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 1295-316. Congress can, for example, amend
statutes to clarify meaning when the President adopts an interpretation with which Congress
is unhappy, id. at 1295-99; adopt hammer provisions to force executive action, id.; control
presidential action through appropriations, id. at 1299-303; coerce presidential cooperation
with legislative priorities by collaterally attacking unrelated presidential priorities, id. at
1303-05; provide for judicial review of executive action at the insistence of private parties, id.
at 1307-10; isolate agencies from political control, id. at 1310-12; and, ultimately, censure or
even impeach the President, id. at 1305-07.
29. See id. at 1316-20.
30. For extensive coverage of the complications of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, see
generally Volumes 13 to 14AA of CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2017).
31. See Elliott, supra note 7, at 466-67; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Make Sense of
Supreme Court Standing Cases—A Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23 WM . & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 105, 126 (2014).
32. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 1261, 1316-20.
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judicial branch that has the final word on constitutional questions,
at least when those questions are properly presented.33 And the
Congress-versus-President lawsuit meets pre-standing-doctrine34
notions of concreteness and adversity; such a lawsuit raises no
concerns about collusion35 or advisory opinions.36
The third benefit of Professor Sant’Ambrogio’s approach is that
it would serve to limit Congress’s access as a plaintiff as much as to
grant it. It is no small thing, as I discuss further below, to allow one
branch of the government to sue the second branch in the forum provided by the third—indeed, such access may be so problematic that
it should be foreclosed.37 But certainly it seems that such intervention should at least be rare.38 Because Professor Sant’Ambrogio’s
33. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (“The judicial authority to determine the constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies, is based on the premise that the
‘powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken,
or forgotten, the constitution is written.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
176 (1803))); e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 YALE L.J.F. 86, 89 (2016)
(suggesting that, once the Supreme Court has been returned to its full complement of nine
Justices after Justice Scalia’s death, “[t]he reconstituted Court will likely continue to take an
active role, rather than a role of pragmatic abstention and avoidance, in resolving disputes
between the political branches—a role more consistent with the Court’s general duty to
interpret the Constitution and laws of the United States when the lives or liberties of
individuals depend on their meaning”).
34. Despite its status today as “an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III,” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992),
standing doctrine did not achieve its modern tripartite form until 1981, in the case Watt v.
Energy Action Education Foundation, 454 U.S. 151, 161 (1981). As recently as 1979, for
example, the Court had stated a two-part test: “The crucial elements of standing are injury
in fact and causation.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 120 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. E.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 359-60 (1911); see also Nash, supra note
27, at 372 (“[T]here is no more reason to think that Congress and the President would invent
an interbranch conflict than to expect executive agencies to fabricate an intrabranch dispute,
and yet the Court has been open to recognizing standing to adjudicate disputes between
executive agencies.”).
36. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, § 3529.1.
37. See infra Part II.
38. Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997) (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been
especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether
an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”); see also Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and
the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1146-47 (1973) (“Courts do violence to a
democratic separation of powers when they legitimize executive assaults upon legislative
prerogatives. If the courts define the privilege narrowly, so as to entertain on the merits
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foregrounding of the separation-of-powers issues clarifies that Congress cannot resort to the courts when it has legislative avenues for
action, he limits congressional lawsuits to a narrow class of cases.
Indeed, on his analysis, Congress actually can get quite a lot done
using its constitutionally conferred armory.39 Thus the only cases in
which Congress might be able to sue are cases challenging presidential inaction on constitutional grounds.40 That Sant’Ambrogio’s
theory both authorizes and limits congressional suit is a virtue.
II. THE LARGER SEPARATION-OF-POWERS CONTEXT
Legislative exhaustion provides a principle upon which we could
intelligibly authorize Congress to sue the President. But if we wish
to add the power of suit to Congress’s toolbox, we need to think
about the consequences of that addition for the balance of powers
established by the Constitution. Indeed, Professor Sant’Ambrogio
himself acknowledges that “[t]here may be other reasons to deny
Congress standing” even in cases where legislative exhaustion
would permit it.41
A. A Reverse Example
For those wishing to empower Congress to sue the President, the
presidential failure to enforce or defend a federal statute serves as
the typical example.42 A recent, prominent reverse example is the
historically unusual refusal of the U.S. Senate to hold an up-ordown vote on President Obama’s nomination to the Supreme Court
of Chief Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

executive-motivated challenges to legislative activities, they will subject themselves to weighty pressures which threaten to politicize their processes.”).
39. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 1295-316.
40. Id. at 1316-20.
41. Id. at 1270; see also id. at 1344 (“There may be other reasons to bar Congress from
court, but neither Legislative Exhaustion nor the deliberation-forcing goals of interbranch
conflict provide one.”).
42. See, e.g., id. at 1272-80; Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the
Principal-Agent Problem, 106 NW . U. L. REV. 1201, 1208 (2012); Abner S. Greene, Interpretive
Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the Enforce-But-Not-Defend Problem,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 598 (2012).
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D.C. Circuit.43 Just as the President has a textual duty to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,”44 the Constitution assigns to
the Senate the role of giving its “Advice and Consent” to the
President’s nominations of “Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States.”45 If Congress can sue the President for failing to
“take Care,” should the President not be able to sue the Senate for
refusing to provide its “Advice and Consent”?46
One answer, of course, is that the text of the Constitution does
not impose on the Senate a duty to vote in the way that it imposes
on the President the duty to take care. After all, Article II states
that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”47 The Constitution describes the “Advice and Consent” of the
Senate with no such mandatory words.48 And, indeed, party leaders
in the Senate have disagreed over whether there is a mandatory
duty to hold a vote on a nominee.49
43. See Neil S. Siegel, The Harm in the GOP’s Pseudo-Principled Supreme Court Stance,
HILL (Apr. 15, 2016, 12:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/276462the-harms-in-being-pseudo-principled-about-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/4DNT-9JY8]
(“One would have to go back to the late 1860s—during Reconstruction—to find a Senate that
did anything comparable to what this Senate is doing.”).
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
45. Id. art. II, § 2.
46. Id. art. II, §§ 2-3. At least one commentator suggested a different avenue: that the
President could appoint Chief Judge Garland to the Supreme Court without Senate confirmation if the Senate refused for a sufficiently long time to vote up or down on the nomination.
See Gregory L. Diskant, Obama Can Appoint Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court if the
Senate Does Nothing, WASH . POST (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
obama-can-appoint-merrick-garland-to-the-supreme-court-if-the-senate-does-nothing/2016/04/
08/4a696700-fcf1-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html [https://perma.cc/C5QX-9N6C]. The argument relies on the proposition that “[i]t is altogether proper to view a decision by the Senate
not to act as a waiver of its right to provide advice and consent.” Id. Diskant’s general argument did not receive general approbation. See, e.g., Ed Whelan, Gobsmackingly Stupid Op-Ed,
NAT’L REV. (Apr. 10, 2016, 8:54 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/433888/
diskant-gobsmacking-stupidity [https://perma.cc/AEE7-WWH4].
Diskant went on to say that, if the President appointed Chief Judge Garland to the Court
without Senate confirmation, “[p]resumably the Senate would then bring suit challenging the
appointment.” Diskant, supra. This suggestion highlights the oddity of the imbalance in
access to the courts. Why does it require the President to take an unprecedented and highly
controversial step and then have the Senate sue in return? Would it not be more straightforward for the President to sue the Senate for its failure to act?
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
48. Id. art. II, § 2.
49. See Alexander Bolton & Jordain Carney, Reid Plots Strategy to Force Vote on Obama
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Even if the Senate has a duty to hold an up-or-down vote,
however, a second issue is whether Congress itself is an entity that
can be sued—not simply because of the general sovereign immunity
of the United States,50 but because of the special immunity accorded
to legislators in the Constitution.51 The Constitution provides that
“for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”52 Subsequent
interpretations have read the Speech and Debate Clause broadly to
“protect[ ] Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon
or threaten the legislative process.”53 Indeed, even the time and
energy of responding to a lawsuit is too much of a burden on
members of the legislative branch.54 Members of the House and
Senate are immune from suit.55
It is unclear, however, whether the Speech and Debate Clause
protects the body of Congress as a whole or only its individual
members. The text of the Constitution suggests the latter, extending protection to “Senators and Representatives.”56 Similarly,
Supreme Court cases invoking the clause have been careful to refer
Nominee, HILL (Apr. 5, 2016, 8:08 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/275235-reid-rareprocedural-tactic-an-option-to-move-garland [https://perma.cc/XL9Z-32L3] (comparing Senator
Harry Reid’s recent statement—“The obligation is for them to hold hearings and to have a
vote. That’s in the Constitution.”—with Senator Reid’s 2005 statement—“The duties of the
Senate are set forth in the Constitution of the United States. Nowhere in that document does
it say the Senate has a duty to give presidential nominees a vote.”).
50. E.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204-06 (1882).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
52. Id.
53. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972).
54. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975) (“[L]egislators acting
within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity ‘should be protected not only from the
consequences of litigation’s results but also from the burden of defending themselves’....
[Litigation] creates a distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and
attention from their legislative tasks.” (quoting Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85
(1967)). See generally JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW (2007).
55. Even though Article II does not give the President the kind of immunity the Speech
and Debate Clause gives members of Congress, courts have implied presidential immunity
from suit based on “the Constitution, federal statutes, and history.” See Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731, 747 (1982). But that immunity is not as invariable as the constitutionally
conferred legislator’s immunity. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712-13 (1974)
(subordinating claim of presidential privilege and immunity from subpoena to the federal
interest in “the fair administration of criminal justice”). The Court has gestured toward the
idea that Congress could waive the President’s immunity even for damages actions. See
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 748 & n.27.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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to it as one that protects the members of Congress.57 It is surprisingly difficult to get a clear answer on whether Congress itself can
be required to defend a lawsuit.58
For purposes of discussion, however, let us assume that Congress,
or a house thereof, would be immune from suit by the President for
failure to undertake a constitutionally required action. Access to the
federal courts on Professor Sant’Ambrigio’s theory would therefore
be asymmetric: Congress could sue the President, but not vice versa.
What consequences would that asymmetry have on our willingness
to allow Congress to sue the President?
B. Consequences of the Reverse Example
How does legislative exhaustion affect the balance of powers?
Does it give Congress too much power if there is no countervailing
executive access to the courts? Professor Nash suggests that this
question is beside the point. He has argued that there may be
“policy arguments against Congress (or members thereof) ... seeking
help from the courts. They are not, however, reasons not to recognize congressional standing in the first place. Standing opens courthouse doors; it does not promise the relief that the plaintiff seeks on
the merits.”59 This highlights the difficulty in thinking of the issue
as one of standing. The interbranch disputes at issue here cannot be
analyzed solely in terms of standing; one can conclude that Congress
has standing under the injury-in-fact test and still be left with the
separation-of-powers question of whether Congress should be able
to sue the President. What, then, are the consequences of allowing
Congress to sue the President, and not vice versa?
One concern might be that Congress would repeatedly embroil the
executive branch in litigation, with the various costs in time and
money that litigation involves.60 Indeed, as discussed above, these
costs are one of the reasons why the Supreme Court has expansively
interpreted the Speech and Debate Clause.61 At this point, we
57. E.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1973); Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616.
58. See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Senate, 432 F.3d 359, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal based on plaintiff’s lack of standing).
59. Nash, supra note 27, at 373 (footnote omitted).
60. See generally Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND . L. REV. 855 (2015).
61. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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should be more precise in asking who is actually bringing the
lawsuit. If it is Congress as a whole, when both houses have to vote
to authorize suit, it seems unlikely that suits will occur often:
obtaining a majority in both houses is challenging.62 In times of
divided government, however, when both houses of Congress are
controlled by one party and the President is a member of another
party, cooperative votes to bring suit would be more likely.63 Suits
by the House or the Senate individually are more likely, and suits
by a subset of legislators more likely still. Of course, the costs of
litigation do not fall only on the defendant; whatever entity is suing
will also face those costs.
Another concern would be that these lawsuits would give Congress a way to shove around the executive branch. But, once sued,
the executive branch could litigate just as aggressively as Congress,
and there is no reason to think that the courts would agree with
Congress on the merits of lawsuits any more often than they agree
with the President. Indeed, Professor Aziz Huq has argued persuasively that courts are biased toward the executive branch,64 which
may deter Congress from suing.65
It is also possible that adding the ability to sue the President
to Congress’s toolbox is exactly what is needed. The executive
branch’s power has expanded mightily over the years.66 Indeed, one
scholar contends that this is unavoidable: “[T]he presidency of the
United States has the institutional disposition and capacity for
constitutional arrogance—to take unilateral actions challenging its
62. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 191, 202 (2007)
(“[B]icameralism and presentment make lawmaking difficult by design.”). Admittedly,
bicameralism without presentment (as would be required of a decision by Congress to sue) is
easier than legislating, but (I think) still difficult.
63. It is worth noting, however, that even in the bitter partisan years early in President
Obama’s second term, only the House intervened in the marriage equality litigation. See
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013).
64. Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM . L. REV. 1595, 167879 (2014).
65. But see 26A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, § 5675 (suggesting that the judicial branch
might simply “fulfill[ ] its usual role of mediator in spelling out the boundaries between the
powers of the two popular branches”).
66. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Essay, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319-21 (2006) (describing a vicious cycle
of legislation, veto power, and judicial deference that has dramatically increased the power
of the executive branch).
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constitutional boundaries and extending its powers at other authorities’ expense.”67 Thus, even if there is asymmetrical access—
even if Congress can bring suit while remaining immune itself—
such asymmetry may offset an existing imbalance.
The final separation-of-powers concern, of course, is what
happens to the courts if they have jurisdiction over these interbranch disputes. The Supreme Court’s standing cases are alive to
the concern:
Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional
structure requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from
a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it hospitably accept for adjudication
claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury.68

A repeated theme in Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence was the worry
that the courts were gaining more and more power, as more types
of disputes were assigned to them.69 The same worry applies here.
Indeed, the specter of the Court resolving a dispute between its two
coequals may be the most worrisome situation of all. But such
concern about judicial overreach “fails to recognize the possibility
that judicial growth may have occurred precisely to balance the even
greater growth of power in the other branches.”70
One might say that, ultimately, this is all something that should
be controlled by the People in elections.71 However, the Court’s continued refusal to find any example of political gerrymandering to be
an Equal Protection Clause violation72 has meant that an increasing
67. Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Arrogance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1650 (2016).
68. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982).
69. See Meyer, supra note 27, at 104; e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611-31
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Meyer, supra note 27, at 105.
71. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power
in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 82-112 (2016) (arguing that governmental power must
be understood with reference not simply to federal and state governmental entities but also
to voters, political parties, interest groups, and the like).
72. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (dismissing a political gerrymandering claim as nonjusticiable); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(“[T]he mere fact that a particular apportionment scheme makes it more difficult for a par-
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number of House seats are Republican sinecures,73 reducing the
ability of the electorate to “throw the bastards out.”74
***
Professor Sant’Ambrogio’s legislative exhaustion idea limits
congressional power to sue the executive branch to suits challenging
presidential inaction based on constitutional questions.75 As I have
suggested, however, even that limited scope may lead to structural
imbalance.76 Any implementation of the legislative exhaustion idea
should take such considerations into account.
III. EXHAUSTION SHOULD NOT BE A GENERAL STANDING
REQUIREMENT
As I have noted, Professor Sant’Ambrogio’s argument is carefully
cabined to the legislative lawsuit context, and he indicates that
standing should be more difficult for Congress than for private
parties.77 But a few courts have suggested that some larger form of

ticular group in a particular district to elect the representatives of its choice does not render
that scheme constitutionally infirm.”). In Vieth, four Justices believed that such claims were
never justiciable. See 541 U.S. at 306. Justice Kennedy, however, who provided the fifth vote
for dismissal, “would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise
rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases.” Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. See REDISTRICTING MAJORITY PROJECT, http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/
[https://perma.cc/66KG-6P2N]. A recent decision by a panel of three district judges in Wisconsin did find unconstitutional a Republican-focused gerrymander. See Whitford v. Gill, No. 15cv-421-bbc, 2016 WL 6837229, at *56 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016) (three-judge panel) (finding
redistricting plan an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander), appeal docketed, No. 16-1161
(U.S. Mar. 24, 2017); see also Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2017 WL 383360, at *3 (W.D.
Wis. Jan. 27, 2017) (three-judge panel) (enjoining use of unconstitutional redistricting plan).
It remains to be seen whether that opinion will be affirmed on appeal.
74. Marcia Pally, ‘Throw the Bastards Out’: An American Tradition from Settlers to
Trump, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/08/donaldtrump-us-history-religion-change [https://perma.cc/U57D-QPKB].
75. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 1316-17.
76. See supra Part I.B.
77. Based on the constitutional tools available to Congress but not private parties, he
suggests there is “generally less, not more, reason to allow the legislature to avail itself of the
federal courts to resolve what are essentially political disputes between the branches over the
merits of government policy.” Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 1269.
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exhaustion should apply as a threshold requirement for litigation
more generally. This suggestion is wrong and should be abandoned.
A. Some Courts Suggest that Exhaustion Is a General Standing
Requirement
We are familiar with the idea of administrative exhaustion: a
plaintiff who wishes to challenge the action of an administrative
agency must show that she gave the agency a fair chance to resolve
her dispute—she must have exhausted her administrative remedies.78 Generally, only then may a court review the agency action.79
And, of course, exhaustion is closely related to the requirement
that a plaintiff obtain a final decision on the merits from the
administrative agency before she may sue.80 It is common in landuse planning cases, for example, to require the landowner to go
through several rounds of planning approval before she may be
heard to say that her permission has been finally and improperly
denied by the agency.81
But it has not been part of the justiciability canon to require a
federal plaintiff, if she has a choice between nonjudicial and judicial
means to solve the problem that faces her, to pursue the nonjudicial
options and fail before a federal court may hear her case. A few
courts have, however, suggested exactly this.
In American Chemistry Council v. Department of Transportation,
trade groups representing hazardous waste manufacturers and
shippers contended that the Department’s regulations had not gone
far enough in regulating their industry.82 The D.C. Circuit rejected
the case for lack of standing, pointing out that the trade groups’
members had other options: “[T]he Court is left to wonder ... why
petitioners cannot protect their ‘products or the tank cars in which
78. 33 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, § 8398.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 186-90 (1985). The logic is that the landowner has not actually been improperly
denied anything if her first application involves plans too grandiose or unlawful to be approved. See id. Only after it can be said that the landowner made a meaningful application
and was rejected, does she have a cause of action. Id. at 190.
82. See Am. Chemistry Council v. Dep’t of Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 811, 814 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
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those products move’ through voluntary self-regulation or private
contracts.”83
But surely it cannot be right that a plaintiff lacks standing to
challenge the scope of a regulatory action if she can achieve the
same results through voluntary self-regulation or private contracts.
If so, almost no challenge to agency underregulation could survive
the standing analysis; almost anything we wish an agency to do
could conceivably be achieved by private action, albeit with extreme
difficulty.84
Similarly, in Grider v. City and County of Denver, one of the
plaintiffs challenged, under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), a requirement that he fence his service dog, a pit bull, or
have the dog seized.85 The court held that Mr. Grider lacked
standing to sue because he had an alternative avenue to solve his
problem: he could obtain a license for his service dog by complying
with the requirement to fence his dog.86
But it cannot be that a plaintiff lacks standing to challenge a
regulation just because the court thinks it would not be hard for her
to comply with the regulation. Again, under that rule, almost any
challenge to regulatory action would fail at the standing stage. The
whole point of Mr. Grider’s lawsuit was that the ADA protected him
against the requirement that he fence his dog,87 just as the challenge to any regulation is that the Constitution, the Administrative
Procedure Act, or the organic statute protects the plaintiff against
that regulation. If the plaintiff alleges harm from having to comply
with the challenged regulation, that is sufficient for Article III
standing—indeed, that is paradigmatic Article III standing.88
83. Id. at 820 (citation omitted). Admittedly, this was only one of a number of problems
with the organization’s standing. See id. at 816-21.
84. See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 34-35 (1989) (noting that, without government to aggregate preferences and act on them, the costs to individuals of obtaining the
benefits of regulation have “transaction costs ... [that] are mind-boggling”).
85. 958 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1265 (D. Colo. 2013).
86. See id. at 1268-69.
87. Id.
88. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992) (noting that when “the
plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue ... there is ordinarily
little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment
preventing or requiring the action will redress it”). It may be that the Court meant that Mr.
Grider could not make out a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA given the possibility of obtaining a license, but that is a merits question, not a standing question.
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B. Exhaustion in General Cannot Be an Article III Requirement
There are both practical and constitutional reasons to reject the
idea that Article III generally requires some sort of exhaustion of
nonjudicial remedies before a plaintiff may bring suit.
Practically speaking, it seems impossible for plaintiffs to meet an
exhaustion requirement or even to know what such a requirement
would entail. Imagine, for example, that a plaintiff alleges that she
has been harmed in a car accident and is bringing suit for damages.
Would an exhaustion requirement require her to demonstrate that
she attempted to settle with the driver of the other car? That she
had tried to get her own insurance company to pay for her injuries?
Or that she had sought some kind of disability payments from the
government? And given the uncertainty in the content of such a
requirement—presumably judges could always think of other, creative ways one could address a problem short of a lawsuit—a plaintiff
could never know until she brings suit whether she has accurately
predicted what the court will require. Yet we typically prefer jurisdictional rules that are predictable.89
The constitutional problem is also apparent. Legislatures, of
course, can impose exhaustion requirements; they do so every time
they require that a party pursue administrative remedies and fail
before being able to sue. And Congress can decline to authorize
judicial review at all90 (although some types of jurisdiction are
constitutionally required91). But it is a far different thing for courts
to say that such exhaustion requirements are constitutionally
mandated.92 Indeed, because the Supreme Court has long recognized
that Congress has wide discretion in fashioning remedial mechanisms,93 building a general exhaustion requirement into Article III
89. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1908) (establishing that, for purposes of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, a federal question must arise
in the plaintiff’s cause of action, rather than in defenses the defendant might raise).
90. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988).
91. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008).
92. Cf., e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional
Common Law, 110 COLUM . L. REV. 479, 484-85 (2010) (discussing the overlapping nature of
many administrative law and constitutional law questions and noting that “addressing these
concerns through ordinary administrative law preserves a degree of flexibility that better
accommodates changing regulatory needs and Congress’s primacy in structuring government
than do more immutable constitutional law prescriptions”).
93. See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 (1940) (“How to effectuate policy—the
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interferes with Article I powers by inhibiting Congress’s ability
to make a lawsuit the preferred remedial action in a statutory
scheme. Rather than permitting Congress to decide whether plaintiffs may take a dispute directly to court or must instead take a
detour through alternative procedures first, constitutionalizing
exhaustion would take that choice away from Congress.
CONCLUSION
Professor Sant’Ambrogio helpfully abandons standing doctrine
in answering the question of federal jurisdiction over Congressversus-President lawsuits; his legislative-exhaustion theory provides a clear and specific way of determining when such lawsuits
might proceed. Whether that theory should be implemented without
compensating theories to be used against Congress is a question
that deserves further consideration. What is clear, however, is that
Article III does not require exhaustion of nonjudicial remedies for
the ordinary plaintiff to have standing.

adaptation of means to legitimately sought ends—is one of the most intractable of legislative
problems. Whether proscribed conduct is to be deterred by qui tam action or triple damages
or injunction, or by criminal prosecution, or merely by defense to actions in contract, or by
some, or all, of these remedies in combination, is a matter within the legislature’s range of
choice.”).
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